



Between the Secular and the National: Representations of Jerusalem in the media coverage of FATAH-affiliated Palestine Satellite Channel

**Ihab Ahmed Awais¹, Wesam Almahallawi², Osama Kanaker³, Mohammed Oklah
Abughazlih⁴, Abeer Z.A. Alhosary⁵**

^{1, 2 and 3} Faculty of Leadership and Management, University Sains Islam Malaysia

⁴ Department of Advocacy and Islamic Media, Al-Jouf University, Saudi Arabia

⁵ Department of Humanities and Media, University College of Applied Science,
Palestine

E-mail: 1Ihab@usim.edu.my; 2wesam10h@gmail.com; 3osama@usim.edu.my;
5barakat_abeer@yahoo.com

Abstract

The holy city of Jerusalem is a crucial element that cannot be ignored in the components of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict over the land. Jerusalem is considered the reason for revolutions and uprisings for the Palestinians to end the occupation of their land. Despite this importance, it suffered from a change in the concepts and presence in the agenda of the main Palestinian faction, particularly *Fatah*. This study uses the agenda-setting theory to examine the political agenda of *Fatah* through analyzing the news coverage and media discourse of Palestine Satellite Channel.



The study is qualitative in nature, as it employed the content analysis method to reach the desired results. The results indicated that the news coverage and highlights of Al-Quds/Jerusalem totally stem from the agenda of *Fatah*. When the faction dropped its armed resistance dogma and adopted the new agenda of negotiations with Israel, the discourse of the faction has changed completely. The results revealed that the basic concept of Jerusalem has become more acceptor of having one capital for two states, which contradicts with the basic beliefs of the Palestinian people. Also, the results showed that the channel emphasized on highlighting secular and nationalistic concepts of the city rather than religious.

Keywords: media discourse, political agenda, Palestine TV, Jerusalem, Israeli occupation.

الملخص

إن قضية القدس عنصر حاسم لا يمكن تجاهله في مكونات ثوابت القضية الفلسطينية وبقيائها، وكانت بوصلة الثورات والانتفاضات للفلسطينيين التي إنطلقت لمقاومة الاحتلال. وعلى الرغم من هذه الأهمية، فقد عانت من تغيير في المفاهيم والتركيز في جدول أعمال الفصيل الفلسطيني الرئيسي والمتربع على كرسي الحكم والتي يطلق عليها اختصاراً "حركة فتح". استخدمت هذه الدراسة نظرية ترتيب الأولويات لتحليل وتقييم الأجندة والاعلامية ومحدداتها السياسية لحركة فتح من خلال تحليل التغطية الإخبارية والخطاب الإعلامي لقناة فلسطين الفضائية التابع لها. الدراسة ذات طبيعة نوعية، حيث استخدمت في منهجها طريقة تحليل المحتوى للوصول إلى نتائج اهداف وأسئلة الدراسة. حيث كشفت النتائج أن التغطية الإخبارية وأبرز ما ينشر حول القدس ينبع كلياً من أجندة حركة فتح وتوجهاتها الذي انتهجته بعدما أسقطت خيار المقاومة المسلحة واعتمد التوجه نحو السلام والمفاوضات الجديدة مع إسرائيل، تغير خطاب الفصيل كلياً. لذلك، أصبح المفهوم الأساسي للقدس أكثر تقبلاً لوجود عاصمة واحدة لدولتين مقسمة ما بين شرقية وغربية، وهو ما يتعارض مع المعتقدات الأساسية للشعب الفلسطيني.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الأجندة السياسية، الخطاب الإعلامي، تلفزيون فلسطين، القدس، الاحتلال الإسرائيلي.



1. Introduction

Jerusalem has been subjected to a series of tensions and debates between the Palestinians and Israelis. These tensions did not protect the city from the fate that followed other elements of the Palestinian cause such as the unity of the land and the right to return to the areas of 1948. Al-Quds (in Arabic) or Jerusalem is a holy city in the three Abrahamic religions, and its importance to these religions has been raised over history (Mayer & Mourad, 2008). Jerusalem is considered an Arab city for Palestinians of Islamic and Christian faith as the city has significant religious landmarks for both. (Lybarger, 2007). Palestinians do not merely seek a geographical spot as the capital of their state, but strive to proclaim their Arab-Islamic identity stemming from their historic rights in the city, which in turn allow them to declare the city as the capital of the Palestinian state (Amer, 2012).

However, this concept, despite its importance, has been subjected to geographic, intellectual and political representations in the political discourse of the Palestinian factions over time. When looking at the Palestinian media, there are two prevailing political tendencies to define the Palestinian notions; one belongs to the Islamic Resistance Movement (*Hamas*), while the other is the opposite non-religious Palestinian National Liberation Organization (*Fatah*) (Amer, 2012; Blank, 2011; Lybarger, 2007). These two main political factions have always been in ideological rivalry upon their elementary conceptualization of the struggle with Israeli and the Palestinian motherland. The contradictory political movements circulate their political agendas to their followers, through a series of messages and representations of the Palestinian concepts; in which Jerusalem is one of these concepts. With all that is taking place on the ground by Israel towards Jerusalem, like Judaization and restrictions of Muslim prayers, the Palestinian media coverage of Jerusalem is not considered unified by the various Palestinian media discourses.



The partisan discourse is directed to the members of the factions of *Fatah* and *Hamas*, through the visual media owned by them, which are Palestine and Al-Aqsa satellite channels. Through these channels, the parties can circulate their discourse to all the Palestinian public, which means disseminating the recognized agendas governing the behavior of each party and its reactions to private or common issues, including the issue of Jerusalem.

This article aims at examining the concept of Jerusalem in one Palestinian media, specifically in the National TV channel owned by *Fatah* called: Palestine satellite channel. The study attempts to examine the impact of the political bases that direct the programs of the channel with regards to the concept of Jerusalem. Meanwhile, this study aims to answer the following questions, specifically what is the prevalent concept of Jerusalem in Palestine Satellite Channel, and what is the level of significance does Palestine Satellite Channel give to the matters of Jerusalem in its news broadcast?

2. Literature Review

Jerusalem, for the Palestinians, is considered an essential component of the Palestinian identity and struggle with the Israelis (Amer, 2018). Nevertheless, when the political scene changed after the winning of *Hamas* in the 2006 legislative elections Palestinian Authority faced tremendous pressure to maintain a media discourse free from provocation against Israel. Consequently, the discourse of Palestine Satellite Channel has altered from representing the Jerusalem news from a traditional religious viewpoint to a rather civil coverage of city's issues (Awais, 2017).



2.1 Launching and Establishing Fatah Movement

The features of *Fatah* began to emerge in the late 1950s and mid-1960s. Many researchers attribute this reason to the Palestinian need for an entity that represents them and their need to strive for freedom, away from the Arab political pressures and judgments that governed the performance of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) led by Ahmad Shukairy (Odeh, 2011). Thus, their groups and meetings began in various Arab countries such as Egypt, the Gulf States, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Officially, it was considered the start of the movement linked to one of its most prominent guerrilla operations against the occupation in the town of Eilabun, inside the occupied territories in 1948, on January 1, 1965 (Salama, 2009). Later, through its “Storm” military apparatus, its military operations intensified. *Fatah* established itself popularly, militarily and politically after the “Marakatul Karama” Battle of Dignity, which took place on March 31, 1968. The movement achieved a remarkable victory over the occupation army, making it a crucible for a large number of Palestinian factions, especially since all the factions that joined under the agenda of the movement were calling for the same principles announced by *Fatah* in its first statement issued on December 13, 1964.

One of the most important principles of *Fatah* was the pursuit of the battle to liberate Palestine from the occupation. In addition to considering the illegality of all UN resolutions that undermined the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination, *Fatah* considered the Israeli presence in Palestine as a Zionist invasion and fought it under the Arab nationalism dogma. Salama (2009) pointed out that the movement has always believed in the idea of eradicating the Zionist entity or the state and society of the Zionist colonial occupation. During its history, it aimed to destroy Israel as an economic, political, and military entity. It also aimed to restore Palestine as a whole, and as it was before the Nakba in 1948. Therefore, the ideas of revolution and armed struggle were the cornerstones of the movement in the context of its vision to resolve the conflict.



However, this faith and these goals were soon shaken by the speech of Fatah leader and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat to the UN General Assembly on November 13, 1974, in which he said “I have brought you an olive branch with a rebel gun, do not drop the green branch from my hand” (Al-Satari, 2016, p. 50). This trend was contradicting to the spirit that established the *Fatah* movement and PLO, which led many members to split from the movement by the mid-1980s. A political climate within the movement that became the dominant hand in the PLO was set in motion away from the armed struggle. There has been a near international and Arab unanimity calling PLO for a settlement of the struggle based on a two-state solution: an Israeli state on the pre-1967 borders and a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza (Chomsky, 1999). This trend was reinforced by the increasing absence of the movement’s extremist leaders by their martyrdom, such as Abu Jihad and Abu Iyad, or by their defections such as Abu Musa and Abu Nidal (Ahmed, 2007).

With the outbreak of the “Intifada” or the “Uprising” in 1987, the Second Gulf War in 1991, and the Arab and international marginalization of the PLO following its stand with Saddam Hussein against Kuwait, PLO roles in the Intifada have diminished due to its geographical distance and the emergence of Islamic forces that dominated the Palestinian internal arena (Al-Satari, 2016).

All these factors pushed for a political settlement with the occupier, through Madrid Conference in 1991, and later the Oslo Agreement in 1993, which forced the *Fatah* leaders led by Yasser Arafat, to accept a Palestinian state on the borders of June 4, 1967, with recognizing the right of the occupying power to exist (Ahmed, 2007). Therefore, the method of political settlement and negotiations replaced the method of armed struggle as a way to liberate Palestine. The new ideology of negotiations became the primary concern of the Palestinian leadership along with the consequent maintenance of security coordination with “Israel “ (Bishara, 2016; Sharif, 2018).



Thus, Arafat agreed to establish an autonomous entity for the Palestinians and the postponement of all the foremost Palestinian issues to the final status negotiations, which include: Jerusalem, water resources, refugees, borders, and settlements (Finkelstein, 2003; Said, 1995). As a result, *Fatah* has moved away from the armed struggle and liberating the whole land from its sea to its river, to a program of a secular, bi-national democratic state that brings Arabs and Jews together. Then *Fatah* started to advertise for a program calling for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the territories of 1967, which can be established from any part of the land of Palestine (Al-Smadi, 2008).

The result of all of these agreements caused disappointment to the Palestinians as the Right of Return to the historic land of Palestine is no longer recognized. Instead, the security-for-peace replaced the land-for-peace equation, the dismantling of all settlements was rejected, and the dream of having Jerusalem as the capital has ended (Hamada, 2016).

2.3 Determinants of the Concept of Jerusalem in Fatah Political Agenda

From the first day of the occupation of the city of Jerusalem in 1967, and to this day the Israeli side has not retreated from its positions on full control of the city and considering the two parts (East and West) as its capital. On July 30, 1980, the Knesset issued a resolution making united Jerusalem an “eternal capital” of Israel, and these positions were consistently emphasized from the 27th Zionist Congress in 1968 to the 34th Zionist Congress in 1998 (Sharif, 2018).

Even during the Oslo Accord, the Israeli side did not authorize its agreement to grant the Palestinians any control over the city of Jerusalem, or even apply the Fourth Geneva Convention to deal with it as an occupied territory. This means that the city should not be tampered with or altered demographically, geographically or politically.



Instead, what Israel has done is a message of reassurance sent from the Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres to the Norwegian Foreign Minister Holst in 1993. The letter stated that Israel recognizes the functional interests of PLO and all Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem to perform significant tasks for the Palestinian population. Accordingly, Israel undertakes not to obstruct the activities of these institutions. This pledge was transferred to PLO (Al-Modalal, 2007).

Despite these indications, the Israeli side did not intend to grant the Palestinians any right to Jerusalem. The Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat pointed out at a conference in Amman which discussed the 1993 negotiations, that Jerusalem is contained in the agreement (Abu Nahl, 2011). Arafat meant only East Jerusalem, whose population participated in the first and second Palestinian legislative elections. The first paragraph (1) of Annex I to the Oslo-1 Agreement stipulates that Palestinians living in Jerusalem have the right to participate in the electoral process (Abu Tarboush, 2017; Said, 1995). At Camp David 2000, Yasser Arafat refused to cede Palestinian sovereignty over the Al-Masjid al-Aqsa and Mount Mukaber but had previously agreed to the sovereignty of the occupation over the Western Wall, some Jerusalem neighborhoods of high Jewish density, and some settlements on East Jerusalem (Abu Nahl, 2011).

It is noticeable that *Fatah* has its vision regarding the concept of the 'city of Jerusalem' and its borders. It is adopting the view that the eastern borders of the city as Palestinian, without the western side that was occupied in 1948. Thus, East Jerusalem, in the current discourse of *Fatah*, is the future capital of a secular democratic state, while West Jerusalem is the capital of the State of Israel (Al-Smadi, 2008). However, After the death of Yasser Arafat, PA announced its waiver in negotiations on illegal settlements in East Jerusalem to Israel (Hamada, 2016).



2.3 Palestine Satellite Channel (PSC) as the Voice of Fatah Movement

From the very beginning of the *Fatah* movement, its leadership has paid great attention to its media, whether it is directed to the Palestinians in the homeland, to its followers and members, or to the international community. In the beginning, *Fatah* launched its first media message through a magazine, with the declaration of its rejection of Arab tutelage over the Palestinian people, stressing that PLO is a melting pot for the Palestinian people and mobilizing them politically and militarily towards its first goal (Alimi, 2007; Tarban, 2009).

When PLO returned to the Palestinian territories following the Oslo Accords, on July 1, 1994, the Palestinian Authority established a Radio and Television Authority, which included Palestine TV. It started its local broadcast in early 1995 and was followed with the establishment of the Palestine Satellite Channel (PSC) in 1998. Due to the overlapping of their actions and trends, a decision in 2005 was issued to unify them under the name of “Palestine Satellite Channel” (Ahmed, 2007).

Despite the fact that PSC was established to represent the general Palestinian people, contribute to exposing the practices of the Israeli occupation against the Palestinians, and attract more international supporters of the rights of the Palestinians; yet it was seen as a typical model for a government media. Its basic role became mainly involved in shedding light on the performance of the Palestinian Authority. Since the channel is now voicing the government, a change in discourse has been detected due to the new wave of democratization and peace with Israel in the Middle East (AbuKhalil, 1997).

After the Palestinian elections in 2006, in which *Hamas* took control of the Legislative Council and the government, a presidential decree was issued to transfer the General Authority for Palestine Radio and Television channel to the powers of President Mahmoud Abbas, the Chairman of PLO and the Revolutionary Council of *Fatah* (Athuraya, 2010).



Thus, PSC became a sole media voice for the agenda of *Fatah*, and one of its weapons against its political enemies.

2.4 Framework of the study

The current study focuses on investigating the how *Fatah*'s PSC represents Jerusalem to its viewers according to the party's agenda. Thus, the researchers chose Agenda Setting Theory (AST) to examine how the PSC is setting the viewers' agendas concerning Jerusalem/Al-Quds

Agenda setting studies were initiated following the Chapel Hill presidential elections campaign by Maxwell McComb and Donald Shaw in 1968 (Ahmad et al., 2017). The study theorized that the political campaign agenda was set by the mass media and consequently determined issues perceived relevant by the public. In the media studies, the agenda-setting term refers to intentional or unintentional procedures of impact, through which importance of social occasions and characters in the public opinion is determined by the succeeding representations of such occasions and characters in the mass media. Therefore, the public attitude can be shaped and concentrated by the repetitive media coverage, and the highlighted people or issues would become more prominent.

Following the original investigation of McComb and Shaw huge numbers of studies were influenced by their theory and replicated their model onto their various contexts. Some studies investigated the factors affecting events reporting as news, to be construed as the media agenda. The external media factors influencing the Media Agenda include Advertisers, Public Relations, Political Personalities; Government Authorities while at the organizational level, owners and top executives do influence the inclusion of news (Colistra, 2012 cited in Idid, 2017). In the case of our study, government authorities are the influencing the factor.



Some of the most recent studies about agenda setting were conducted on the Malaysian context with relation to the 13th General elections held in 2013. Idid (2017) stated in his study tackling three ethnic newspapers in Malaysia that each newspaper highlighted public agenda of the country, but still cared for the agendas of each ethnic race. While ethnic newspapers in Malaysia cared for ethnic issues, Malaysian English newspapers were led by other agenda. Kee et al. (2017) concluded in their quantitative study that the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) and the Government agencies were the main sources of news for English media. According to the data, limited space was given to the opposing alliance Pakatan Rakyat in comparison to the space given to Barisan Nasional, even in the coverage of ethnic Malaysian newspapers.

3.0 Methodology

The study aims to analyze the performance of PSC over 2018, in terms of the coverage of Jerusalem issues. The study is qualitative in nature as it has utilized the content analysis method to collect the data and agenda-setting theory to analyze the content. The study is limited to one faction media outlet, which mean that more studies are recommended to be conducted on the other Palestinian faction media outlet, *Hamas*.

The data was collected within the year 2018 from 24 news broadcast: 2 news broadcasts per month over the period of 12 months. The data collected was coded for emerging themes to understand the quality and quantity of media coverage of the issue of Jerusalem, and to answer the study question. The researchers focused on the following elements in the data collection and analysis:

1. The theme: It refers to focusing on short sentences that include a set of ideas related to the city of Jerusalem in the sample of the study .Therefore, all information materials related to the city of Jerusalem were coded and thematized in the sample of the study.



2. *The method of counting and measuring*: It refers to a system of regular quantitative recording of the themes and categories, through which the reconstruction of the content in the form of numbers can help to reach the desired results and achieve the objectives of the study. The study used repetition as a method of counting and measurement.

4.0 Results and discussion

Regarding the results, the paper presents them according to the objectives and questions of the study, taking into account that all the results and tables for each goal.

4.1 *The representations of Al-Quds/ Jerusalem in Aqsa TV*

To answer the first question: what is the prevalent concept of Jerusalem in Palestine Satellite Channel? The following table shows the count of terms and their basic themes.

Table 1. The Concept of Jerusalem, in PSC

Concepts	Terms the news broadcast	Repetition	%
Religious/Islamic	The First Qibla	2	1.38%
	The Holy City	7	4.83%
	The Land of Religions	6	4.14%
	Al-Quds/Jerusalem is a land of Islamic Waqif	0	0.00%
	Baitul Maqdis	0	0.00%



	Arab Jerusalem	12	8.28%
Arab/National	Al-Quds/Jerusalem, the Capital	21	14.48%
	The old city	5	3.45%
	Al-Quds/Jerusalem, the capital of” the Zionist entity”	0	0.00%
Political	Al-Quds/Jerusalem as the capital of the State of “occupation”	16	11.03%
	Two-state solution	9	6.21%
	Occupied Al- Quds/Jerusalem	36	24.83%
	East Al- Quds/Jerusalem	19	13.10%
	West Al- Quds/Jerusalem	1	0.69%
	TOTAL	145	100%

The concepts mentioned in Table 1 about Jerusalem are concepts widely known among the Palestinian people. Therefore, they were the basic themes that the researchers were looking for when coding the data.



These concepts can be divided into three categories, religious/Islamic, Arab/National, and Political. One can notice from a quick view of the numbers that the Religious/Islamic concepts were lower in number and frequency. For example, the concepts 'Baitul Maqdis' and 'Al-Quds/Jerusalem' is a land of Islamic Waqf' were never mentioned in any news broadcast (0%). Also, the other Islamic religious concept 'the First Qibla' was seldom mentioned (1.38%). The other religious concepts that include all three religions, such as the 'Holy City' (4.83%) and 'the Land of Religions' (4.14%), were also less frequent; however, these concepts were higher than the Islamic terms. Such frequency might be due to the secular dogma of the channel stemming from *Fatah*.

On the contrary, the channel asserted the fact that Al-Quds/Jerusalem is occupied (24.83%), which represents the highest frequency among the rest of the concepts. Also, the channel asserted that 'Al-Quds/Jerusalem is the capital (14.48%), but still stressed on the term 'East Jerusalem' with similar weight (13.10%), which means that the channel abides to the terminology agreed upon due to the peace agreements with Israel. Moreover, the channel never highlighted that Al-Quds/Jerusalem as the 'Capital of the Zionist entity' (0%), which could cause the channel serious political issues due to the sensitivity of the word 'Zionist', but at the same time, it recognizes that the occupation is taking al Quds as a capital (11.03%). This was in the context of the Trump administration decision to move the American Embassy to Jerusalem to recognize the city as solely the capital of Israel. Nevertheless, in a desperate move to continue abiding by the peace agreements, the channel recognized that 'Al-Quds/Jerusalem is a two-state solution' (6.21%).




Figure 1. The Concept of Al-Quds/Jerusalem population and its administration in PSC

One can notice from the data in Figure 1 that PSC used the term ‘Al-Quds/Jerusalem people’ (27.96%) and ‘Palestinians of Al-Quds/Jerusalem’ (25.8%) with close rates, in comparison to the lower ration of ‘Residents of Al-Quds/Jerusalem.’ This indicates that the channel considers the population of (East Al-Quds/Jerusalem) belonging to the broader frameworks of their city, as the Palestinian society as a whole. However, when referring to the Israeli side, the channel highly referred to them as ‘Israeli police’ (19.3%) more than ‘Occupation Police’ (3.23%), which indicates how careful the channel is in its discourse with the Israeli authority over Al-Quds/Jerusalem. This is due to the Oslo agreement negotiations to postpone the negotiations of Jerusalem to the final stage of the peace solutions.



4.2 The degree of media attention in Al-Quds/Jerusalem issues

To answer the second question, what is the level of significance does Palestine Satellite Channel give to the matters of Jerusalem in its news broadcast? The study analysed the frequency and highlights topics of the various issues of Al-Quds/Jerusalem, each issue individually. It also noted the motives and objectives of media coverage, whether it is based on the daily developments of the situation or does it bring issues to the spotlight to entrench them in the minds of the public and followers. Therefore, the study envisaged several factors; such as the media format used to talk about the issue, the allocation time and size of the issue and the location of this issue in the news broadcast. The results were as follows:




Figure 2. Media attention in the issues of Al-Quds/Jerusalem in PSC

While PSC highlighted 'the US Embassy transfer to Al-Quds/Jerusalem' (17.9%) and the 'Racist occupation laws' (16%); the channel completely ignored the deportation of the people, children nations, and the excavations under the Aqsa Mosque. Other issues received equal weight such as the settlements, resistance to Al-Quds/Jerusalem people (assaults, prisoners and martyrs), restrictions on the educational process, restrictions on Al-Aqsa Mosque and annexation of Al-Quds/Jerusalem (7.14%). PSC has been able to cover these topics over the 24 bulletins 56 times.




Figure 3. The Allocation of Al-Quds/Jerusalem highlight in PSC news broadcast

In Figure 3, the data shows that Al-Quds/Jerusalem issues were highly mentioned in the headlines, but at the same time, it usually comes in the second news recited. This is depending on the national issues that the channel prioritize.




Figure 4 Media formats used to cover the issues of Al-Quds/Jerusalem in PSC

Figure 4 indicates that Palestine Satellite Channel covered the issues of Al-Quds via news (33.93%) of the times, followed by live reports given time to report incidents taking place on the ground at the time of the news. The rest of the formats with almost very close weight of coverage are recorded reports, interviews and internal reports.




Figure 5. Time allocation for news coverage of Al-Quds/Jerusalem issues in PSC



Figure 5 demonstrates that the highest time allocated to cover AI-Quds/Jerusalem issues was 0 to 5 minutes (44.6%) of the news broadcasts. The highest time that PSC has allocated to AI-Quds/Jerusalem issues was from 25 to 30 minutes, which was a very rare case (1.79%).




Figure 6. Reason of media coverage of AI-Quds/Jerusalem issues in PSC

The motivation of the coverage reflects the interest of the channel through the degree of focus on those events and issues that are not visible, or are not currently addressed in other media. Also, we can understand the editorial policy in the news coverage, whether it puts the issue of AI-Quds/Jerusalem permanently in the circle of the event, or when breaking news imposes itself on the news context. It should be noted here that the channel has started from the developments on the ground to shed light on the issue of AI-Quds/Jerusalem.



Therefore, the channel made no effort in intensive research to highlight other core issues and have limited itself to the conditions and events that arise on the spot (80.3%).

5.0 Conclusion

The study was conducted to analyze the concept of Al-Quds /Jerusalem in the media coverage of the *Fatah* affiliated PSC to determine the level of agenda governing this coverage. The study employed the theoretical framework of agenda setting and content analysis to analyze the data collected from 24 news broadcasts in 2018, with 2 random broadcasts selected per month. The results reveal that the channel asserts Al-Quds/Jerusalem as the capital of the State of Palestine by agreeing on East Jerusalem as the capital. Palestine channel highlights that East Jerusalem is considered an Arabic city that has the sanctity for all religions. Yet, influenced by its secular agenda, PSC focuses more on the national importance of the city. In addition, since the *Fatah* faction has dropped the armed resistance dogma to free Palestine and adopted the pragmatic agenda of negotiations with Israel to reach peace, its discourse and use of vocabulary have changed accordingly. The channel foregrounds that Al-Quds/Jerusalem can be a capital for two states with its east part for the Palestinians and its west part for the Israelis. PSC attempts to follow the American and European agenda in handling the issues of Jerusalem. It is dictated by the terms of the agreements with the Israeli occupation state, which has negative repercussions on the concept of the city of Jerusalem, in general. One of these repercussions is distorting and instilling the dimensions of the conflict in Jerusalem in the mentality of the Palestinian and Arab viewer from a deficient point of view, who receives information from the point of view of one faction.

Moreover, it is clear from the data that PSC is interested in Al-Quds/Jerusalem issues.



This interest has been translated into a more extended time allocation of news coverage, a higher number of reports and interviews, a more thorough discussion of the issues, and a higher level of bulletins. However, it suffered from the absence of interesting journalistic formats; such as live broadcasts, news tour, investigation or even a storyboard. Its performance focused purely on presenting traditional news formats without any renovation.

Finally, this study was limited to the media outlet of one faction representing parts of the Palestinians. There are other factions among the Palestinian people, which also have their own media outlets voicing their political agendas. Therefore, we recommend further studies to analyze the discourse of these outlets to examine the type of agenda they are presenting to the public, whether on the concept of Jerusalem or other issues pertaining to the Palestinian-Israeli struggle.

References

- Abu Nahl, O. (2011). The negotiating position of president Yasser Arafat at the Camp David Summit. In *Yasser Arafat*. Ramallah. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/274634507_almwqf_altfawdy_llryys_yasr_rfath_fy_qmt_kamb_dyfyd
- Abu Tarboush, M. (2017). Jerusalem and peaceful settlement. Retrieved September 20, 2018, from <http://www.alquds-online.org/index.php?s=articles&id=534>
- AbuKhalil, A. (1997). Change and democratisation in the Arab world: The role of political parties. *Third World Quarterly*, 18(1), 149–163. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436599715109>
- Ahmad, Z. A., Ahmed, I. S. Y., Wakichan, H., Halem, H., Hussin, S. H., & Ganiyu, M. A. (2017). GE 13: The influence of ethnic newspapers in shaping the opinion of Indian



and Chinese voters. *Jurnal Komunikasi: Malaysian Journal of Communication*, 33(2), 40–54. <https://doi.org/10.17576/JKMJC-2017-3302-04>

Ahmed, M. (2007). *The Palestinian national liberation movement Fatah and its impact on political development in Palestine*. An-Najah National University.

Al-Modalal, W. (2007). The Israeli Occupation of Jerusalem and the future of the settlement. *Palestin Studies*, 18(30), 39–52. Retrieved from https://www.palestine-studies.org/sites/default/files/mdf-articles/7445_0.pdf

Al-Satari, H. (2016). *Official political settlement projects for the Arab-Israeli conflict in Palestinian affairs magazine (1971-1993)*. Islamic University of Gaza.

Al-Smadi, H. (2008). *The PLO's political experience from armed resistance to a political settlement (1964-2006)*. An-Najah University.

Alimi, E. (2007). Discursive contention: Palestinian media discourse and the inception of the “first” intifada. *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*, 12(4), 71–91. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1081180X07307412>

Amer, M. (2012). The discourse of homeland: The construction of Palestinian national identity in Palestinian secularist and Islamist discourses. *Critical Discourse Studies*, 9(2), 117–131. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17405904.2012.656374>

Amer, M. (2018). The Iconography of a Nation : National Identity Construction in Palestinian Visual Representations. *IUG Journal of Humanities Research*, 28(1), 1–24. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329572717_The_Iconography_of_a_Nation_National_Identity_Construction_in_Palestinian_Visual_Representations

Athuraya, M. (2010). *Managing the Resistant Media in the time of war (Al-Aqsa TV as a model)*. The Islamic University of Gaza.



- Awais, I. (2017). *Media policies of Palestinian satellite channels*. Amman: Dar Al-Jinan.
- Bishara, A. (2016). 4 May 1999 and Palestinian Statehood : To Declare or Not to Declare ?
Journal of Palestine Studies, 28(2), 5–16. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2537930>
- Blank, A. S. (2011). *The Framing of Myth in the Creation of a Palestinian Identity: Hamas, Fatah and Children's Media*. University of Ottawa.
- Finkelstein, N. (2003). *Image and Reality of the Israel–Palestine Conflict* (Second Edi). New York: Verso. Retrieved from <https://books.google.com/books?id=vNb5VkyxDIYC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Image+and+reality+of+the+Israel-Palestine+conflict#v=onepage&q&f=false>
- Hamada, M. (2016). The new Abbas-Hertzog document. Retrieved October 29, 2018, from <https://newspaper.annahar.com/article/416588->
- Idid, S. A. (2017). Agenda setting: Probing the issues during the 13th general election. *Jurnal Komunikasi: Malaysian Journal of Communication*, 33(2), 1–12. <https://doi.org/10.17576/jkmjc-2017-3302-01>
- Kee, C. P., Salman, A., Ni, K. S., Yaakop, M. R. M., Adisa, R. M., & Hoong, O. C. (2017). The agenda setting function of English newspapers during the 13th general election. *Jurnal Komunikasi: Malaysian Journal of Communication*, 33(2), 27–39. <https://doi.org/10.17576/JKMJC-2017-3302-03>
- Lybarger, L. D. (2007). For church or nation? Islamism, secular-nationalism, and the transformation of christian identities in palestine. *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, 75(4), 777–813. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jaarel/lfm066>
- Mayer, T., & Mourad, S. (2008). *Jerusalem: Idea and reality*. New York and London: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203929773>
- Noam Chomsky. (1999). *The fateful triangle: The United States, Israel, and the*



Palestinians. Boston, MA: Southend Press.

Odeh, A. (2011). *The problem of the relationship between Fatah and Hamas and its impact on the process of democratisation in Palestine*. Al-Najah University.

Said, E. E. (1995). *Peace and its Discontents: Essays on Palestine in the Middle East Peace Process*. New York: Vintage Books. Retrieved from http://93.174.95.29/_ads/56319F52D1F3A4D9984CE868951534CF

Salama, A. G. (2009). *Fatah from winning history to losing elections* (First). Ramallah: Al-Bayareq Publishing House.

Sharif, M. (2018). The future of Jerusalem is primarily a political issue. Retrieved October 29, 2018, from <https://orientxxi.info/magazine/>

Tarban, M. (2009). The role of the Palestinian media in confronting the judaization of Jerusalem. In *3rd Jerusalem International Conference*. Algeria. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330662301_falyt_alalam_alflstyny_fy_mwajht_thwyd_alqds